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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY LYNNE JONES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
WILLIAM K. HINKLE and 
KATHRYN P. HINKLE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16525 
This is an action for damages and for specific performance 
of certain provisions in a uniform real estate contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
granting Defendants an award of attorney fees and holding 
that in spite of a contract provision stating that when the 
principal due under the contract was reduced to the amount of 
outstanding loans and mortgages secured or maintained by Sellers 
that Sellers agreed to convey and Buyers agreed to accept 
title to the property subject to the loans and mortgages, 
Sellers had no obligation to convey and Buyer had no right to 
obtain title even if Buyer had paid the principal balance down 
to an amount equaling the balance owing on the outstanding 
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obligation to Deseret Federal Savings and Loan. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the 
lower court reversed, vacating the Summary Judgment and award 
of attorney fees granted to Defendant and to have the case re-
manded for entry of Judgment and award of attorney fees on 
behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts giving rise to the case are as follows: On or 
about May 12, 1977 Plaintiff and Defendants executed and en-
tered into an installment real estate contract. (TR. 38) A 
standard form Unifor~ Real Estate Contract blank (form 106 
which states that it has been approved by the Utah Securities 
Administration and the Utah State Board of Realtors) was used 
in setting forth the terms of contract, (TR. 13) No terms in 
said form contract were changed or deleted. (TR. 13) The 
property is residential in nature and is located in Utah 
County, Utah. (TR. 13) 
The essential terms, other than parties and description, 
specific to this transaction are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 
8, 9, and 21, as follows: 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into 
possession and pay for said described premises 
the sum of Sixty five thousand and no/100---
Dollars ($65,000.00) payable at the office of 
Seller, his assigns or order strictly within 
the following times, to-wit: Twenty five thou-
sand and no/100--- ($25,000.00) cash, the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance 
of $40,000.00 shall be paid as follows: 
-2-
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Three hundred thirteen dollars and sixty cents 
or more on or before the 12th day of June and 
Three hundred thirteen dollars and sixty cents 
on or before the 12th day of each month there-
after until contract balance is paid in full, 
together with all interest accrued and in addi-
tion Buyer to make one balloon payment in the 
amount of $8,163.22 (Eight thousand one hundred 
sixty-three and twenty-two cents) on or before 
May 12, 1978. Said payment to include !/12th of 
property taxes and l/12 of hazard insurance 
monthly. If taxes and insurance increase, 
monthly payments to be adjusted accordingly. 
The buyers shall pay interest on the balloon 
payment of 9 1/2 interest until paid in full. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered 
to buyer on the 12th day of May, 1977. 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied 
first to the payment of interest and second to 
the reduction of the principal. Interest shall 
be charged from May 12, 1977 on all unpaid por-
tions of the purchase price at the rate of nine 
& one-half percent (9 1/2%) per annum. The Buyer 
at his option at anytime, may pay amounts in ex-
cess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid bal-
ance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such 
excess to be applied either to unpaid principal 
or in prepayment of future installments at the 
election of the buyer, which election must be 
able at the time the excess payment is made. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists 
an obligation against said property in favor of 
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan with an unpald 
balance of $31,836.78, as of May 1, 1977. 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, 
execute and malntain loans secured by said property 
of not to exceed the then unpaid contract balance 
hereunder, bearlng interest at the rate of not to 
exceed nine (9%) percent per annum and payable in 
regular monthly installments; provided that the 
aggregate monthly installment payments required to 
be made by Seller on said loans shall not be 
greater than each installment payment required to 
-3-
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be made by the Buyer under this contract. When 
theprincipal due hereunder has been reduced~ 
the amount of any such loans and mort a es the 
Sel er agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to 
accept title to the above described property sub-
Ject to sa1d loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right 
through accelerated payments under this agreement 
to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of 
this agreement against said property, it shall be 
the Buyer's obligation to assume and pay any penalty 
which may be required on prepayment of said prior 
obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect to 
obligations against said property incurred by Seller, 
after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller 
unless said obligations are assumed or approved by 
buyer. 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should 
they default in any of the covenants or agreements 
contained herein, that the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from en-
forcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession 
of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the 
State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing a suit or otherwise. (TR. 13 emphasis added) 
On or about July 1, 1978 Plaintiff contacted Defendants 
directly and explained that she had reduced the principal bal-
ance to the amount of the Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
obligation, had made arrangements with that institution to 
assume that loan, and requested that Defendants transfer title 
to her pursuant to paragraph 8 of the contract. (TR. 51, 52) 
As of that date Plaintiff had made payments reducing the un-
paid balance on said contract to the sum of $31,368.40 which 
was equal to or less than the amount owing on the Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan obligation which was created prior 
-4-
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to Plaintiff's purchase of the property, existing as set forth 
in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the contract and which was the only 
outstanding obligation against the property. (TR. 51) Defen-
dants refused and failed to transfer title to the property. 
(TR. 52) Because of Defendants failure to transfer title at 
that time Plaintiff is presently unable to assume said obliga-
tion without incurring much higher interest expenses. (TR. 52) 
Subsequent to said refusal and since the filing of this lawsuit 
Defendants by affidavit of Kathryn P. Hinkle have admitted 
that paragraph 8 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract provides 
that buyer (Plaintiff) has a right to undertake the principal 
mortgage held by seller (Defendants) and allege generally for 
the first time that certain terms and conditions precedent to 
transfer remained unfulfilled. (TR. 44) 
Defendants have further admitted receipt of payments 
made pursuant to the contract as follows: 
6/30/77 
7/10/77 
8/10/77 
9/6/77 
10/12/77 
11/8/77 
12/8/77 
l/20/78 
2/10/78 
3/6/78 
4/11/7() 
-5-
$313.65 
313.60 
313.60 
313.60 
313.60 
313.60 
313.60 
338.60 
338.60 
338.60 
8,863.33 (balloon payment) 
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5/30/78 $338.60 
6/12/78 338.65 
7/78 338.60 
8/78 338.60 
9/78 338.60 
10/78 338.60 
11/78 338.60 
12/78 338.60 
1/79 338.60 
2/79 347.60 
(TR. 38, 39) 
Plaintiff continued to make payments on said property 
as they became due. (TR. 52) 
It is Defendant's position as set forth in the affidavit 
of Kathryn P. Hinkle that Plaintiff has nothing to gain in 
effecting said title transfer and that Defendants stand to 
loose a sum in excess of $4,000.00 because the rate of inter-
est that Plaintiff pays Defendants according to the contract 
is less than the rate of interest Defendants pay on the obli-
gation to Deseret Federal Savings and Loan. (TR. 45) . 
Plaintiff brought this action November 1, 1978 by filing 
a complaint alleging that the conditions of the contract 
found in paragraph 8 with respect to reduction of the principa 
balance and assumption of outstanding obligations had been 
complied with; that demand for conveyance had been made upon 
Defendants; that Defendants failed and refused to transfer 
the property; that Plaintiff is entitled to specific perform-
-6-
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ance and damages caused to her by delay of Defendants. Defen-
dants answered the complaint denying that Defendants had any 
obligation to convey title to the property and alleging that 
the terms of paragraph 8 of the contract excluded from their 
application the Deseret Federal Savings and Loan obligation 
which was set forth as an existing obligation in paragraph 
6 of the contract. Defendants generally denied the remain-
ing essential elements of Plaintiff's claim and counterclaimed 
for attorney fees. Plaintiff replied to the counterclaim deny-
ing Defendants' claim for attorney fees. 
Defendants answered Plaintiff's requests for admissions 
April ll, 1979 and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported 
by the affidavits of Howard J. Swapp and Kathryn P. Hinkle on 
May 2, 1979. 
May 15, 1979 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
supported by the affidavit of Terry Lynne Jones. 
May 17, 1979 the court heard both motions, denying Plain-
tiff's motion, granting Defendants' motion and awarding an 
attorney fee to Defendants. 
May 22, 1979 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider which 
was denied by the court on June l, 1979. 
ISSUES 
1. The district court erred in interpreting the contract 
to state that Plaintiff had no right to assume the obligation 
set forth in paragraph 6 of the contract pursuant to the terms 
of paragraph 8. 
2. The district court should have held that according 
-7-
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to the terms of the contract Plaintiff has an absolute right 
to assume the obligation set forth in paragraph 6 of the con-
tract when the terms of paragraph 8 are fulfilled. 
3. Defendants are liable for any damages to Plaintiff 
caused by their refusal to transfer title according to the 
terms of the contract. 
4. The district court erred in awarding Defendants an 
attorney fee based upon paragraph 21 of the contract because 
as a condition precedent to the award of attorney fees a find-
ing must be made that a party is in default in a covenant or 
agreement contained in the contract. 
5. The district court should have awarded Plaintiff an 
attorney fee based upon paragraph 21 of the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NO RIGHT TO ASSUME 
THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION ON THE REAL PROPERTY. 
The contract specifically gives Plaintiff, as buyer, the 
right to have seller convey title to the property at such time 
as the principal due on the contract is reduced to the amount 
outstanding on any loans and mortgages secured or maintained 
by Seller on the property pursuant to the provisions of para-
graph 8 of the contract, including the Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan mortgage specifically identified in paragraph 6. In 
the lower court Defendants argued,apparently pursuading the 
court,that the provisions of paragraph 8 of the contract re-
specting Buyer's right to have Seller convey title to her do 
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not apply to the oeseret Federal Savings and Loan mortgage 
maintained by Defendants as set forth in paragraph 6. 
Plaintiff contends and stated by affidavit that the 
conditions specified in paragraph 8 of the contract had been 
complied with and that therefore she had a right to have 
Defendants convey title to the property to her. 
Defendants through the affidavit of Kathryn P. Hinkle 
admit Plaintiff's right to title but generally deny that the 
conditions precedent had been met. This presents a genuine 
issue as to material facts, on its face precluding summary 
judgment, (see discussion under Point II, Supra.) Yet the 
court ruled as a matter of law that Plaintiff had no right 
to have title conveyed to her under any circumstances. This 
conclusion flies in the face of the clear language of the 
contract which this court can determine as the trial court 
could without being bound by the trial court's conclusion. 
Kier v. Condrack, 24 U.2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, (1970). Hart-
man v. Potter, No. 16004, (Utah, filed June l, 1979). 
Paragraph 6 of the contract sets forth the fact of the 
existing Deseret Federal Savings and Loan obligation against 
the property. Paragraph 8 specifically authorizes Seller to 
secure, execute and maintain loans against the property under 
certain conditions. By the principle of ejusdem generis it is 
understood that the loans referred to in paragraph 8 are of 
the same type and kind as the loan specifically referred to 
previously. 
Paragraph 8 then goes on to state: 
-9-
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"When the principal due hereunder has been 
reduced to the amount of any such loans and 
mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the 
Buyer agrees to accept title to the above 
described property subject to said loans and 
mortgages", 
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "Ejusdem Generis" as follows: 
In the construction of laws, wills, and other 
instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is, that 
where general words follow an enumeration of 
persons or things, by words of a particular 
and specific meaning, such general words are 
not to be construed in their wildest extent, but 
are to be held as applying only to persons or 
things of the same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned. . The rule, however, 
does not necessarily require that the general 
provision be limited in its scope to the identi-
cal things specifically named. Blacks Law Diction-
ary, West Publishing Company, 4th Edition. p. 
608, 1951. 
The contract in question specified the Deseret Federal 
Savings and Loan obligation in paragraph 6, identifying for 
buyer the true state of the title to the property. Paragraph 
7 states respecting the title that there are no unpaid special 
improvement taxes on the property. Paragraph 8 then authorizes 
Seller to secure, execute and maintain loans and mortgages 
secured by the property, i.e. obligations of the same kind and 
including the one discussed in the preceding section. Seller 
is specifically authorized to maintain that loan, subject to 
Seller's agreement to convey and Buyer's agreement to accept 
title when the amount that Buyer owes on the contract is 
equal to the amount Seller owes on obligations secured by 
the property. To exclude the principal obligation against 
the property from the operation of this clause would mean that 
Buyer might have to accept title to the property while Seller 
-10-
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still had the benefit of a $30,000.00 loan secured by property 
now in Buyer's name, which Buyer would stand to loose in the 
event of Seller's default on the obligation. Such a construe-
tion would be contrary to the overall terms of the instrument 
and the obvious intent of the parties. 
It is Plaintiff's position that the contract means what 
it says. It is apparently Defendants' position that the contract 
means something else. Although neither party has claimed that 
the contract is ambiguous, the respective positions of the 
parties imply that the court need interpret the contract. Hart-
man v. Potter, supra. 
The basic rules for contract interpretation have been set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court: 
"This intent should be ascertained first from 
the four corners of the instrument itself, 
second from other contemporaneous writings 
concerning the same subject matter, and third 
from the extrinsic parol evidence of the in-
tentions." Continental Bank and Trust Company 
v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98, 306 P.2d 773, (1957). 
Examination of the instrument itself shows in paragraph 3 
that the payment schedule contains an exactly calculated balloon 
payment in the amount of $8,163.22 to be made on or before May 
12, 1978. This payment was calculated by Defendants, who drafted 
the document, to reduce the principal balance of the contract 
to an amount exactly equaling the balance payable to Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan at that time. This was to facilitate 
the intent of the parties at the time the contract was drafted, 
namely that Plaintiff would assume the Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan obligation at that time and Defendants would convey 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
title to the property to Plaintiff. ( TR. 28, 53) The pay-
ment schedule supports Plaintiff's contention that Defendants 
have breached the contract in failing to convey title to the 
property to Plaintiff. 
In additio~ paragraph 9 of the instrument sets forth 
additional options for buyer to accelerate conveyance of the 
property. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract by its terms supports 
Plaintiff's contention that Buyer had a right to have Sellers 
convey title to her pursuant to the terms of paragraph 8. The 
issue of whether or not the provisions of paragraph 8 were met 
by Plaintiff was not considered by the lower court although 
raised by both parties. 
No contemporaneous writings of the parties were introduc~ 
into evidence before the lower court. Parol evidence was sub-
mitted by both parties in the form of affidavits. Plaintiff's 
affidavit supports her contention that she had a right to con-
veyance from Defendants and specifically asserts that all 
conditions precedent were performed by her. The affidavit of 
Kathryn P. Hinkle also supports Plaintiff's contention that 
she has a right to conveyance but generally denies performance 
of the conditions precedent. 
"3. That paragraph 8 provides that buyer 
may undertake the principal mortgage held 
by the seller under certain terms and condi-
tions and that none of the terms and condi-
tions required were fulfilled herein, and, 
therefore, buyers have no right, under para-
graph 8, to assume Seller's mortgage." ( TR. 
4 4' 4 5) • 
-12-
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Under the standard set by this court in Continental Bank 
and Trust Co., supra, all of the evidence supports Plaintiff's 
position that she had a right to have the property conveyed to 
her and the evidence, which of course should be viewed in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiff, raises a most material 
question of fact concerning the performance of the conditions 
set forth in paragraph 8 of the contract. 
It is elemental that the result be as intended by the 
parties and that neither party obtain an unfair advantage by 
varying the terms of the contract. TO deprive Plaintiff of 
her right to have title conveyed to her would create such a 
situation which this court handled in the case of Kier v. Cond-
rack, supra, 
We recognize the validity of the rule relied 
upon by the defendants that to be enforceable 
a contract must be sufficiently definite in its 
terms that the parties know what is required of 
them. But like all rules, which are necessarily 
stated in generality, it is only applicable in 
the proper circumstances, where the justice of 
the case requires: as a shield to protect a 
party from an injustice and not as a weapon with 
which to perpetrate an injustice .... when the 
parties had reached agreement and committed them-
selves on the major aspects of the transaction, 
that is, that the defendants would sell and the 
plaintiff would buy at the agreed price of $23,500, 
if the plaintiff exercised the option within the 
time specified, reserving only the "terms" of 
payment, they should be obliged to act in good 
faith in keeping their promise. It would seem 
inequitable and unjust to permit a seller to 
simply refuse unreasoningly to justify his refusal . 
. . . neither party should be permitted to use the 
reservation of •terms" to get more than they had 
promised: the plaintiff to get more land, or the 
defendants to get more money. nor either to renege 
on the bargain. . p. 142, 143 
-13-
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The court should interpret the contract to reflect the 
intent of the parties and the intent is shown as set forth 
above to the effect that Plaintiff was entitled to conveyance 
of title from Defendants upon demand and when the conditions 
precedent of paragraph 8 were performed. Continental Bank 
and Trust Company, supra, Kier v. Condrack, supra., Oregon 
Shortline Railroad Company v. Idaho Stockyard Co., 124 U. 2d 205, 
365 P.2d 826, (1961). 
Plaintiff simply submits that the contract language 
should be given its usual and ordinary meaning, and that the 
entire body of the contract and the subsequent acts of the 
parties support that meaning. Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99 Pac., 
460, ( 1909). 
POINT II 
IT WAS IMPROPER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment for Defendants as granted by the lower 
court was improper and contrary to Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. and 
the large body of opinion supplementing that rule. 
In a case very similar to the instant case, Sandberg v. 
Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, (Utah, 1978) the Plaintiff sued to have 
an option to purchase real property declared expired and the 
Defendant alleged full performance of all conditions. The 
matter was submitted to the court by motion and affidavit, 
upon which the trial court entered findings, conclusions and 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. The Supreme Court revers~, 
relying on 1) performance of the parties, 2) the equivocal acto 
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of the parties and 3) the need to resolve questions of the 
intent of the parties holding: 
A summary judgment can only be granted under 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., when it is shown there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment, 
as a matter of law, under the operative facts. 
The court cannot consider the weight of testi-
mony or the credibility of witnesses in consid-
ering a motion for summary judgment. Herein 
although the parties were not in complete con-
flict as to certain facts, the understanding, 
intention, and consequences of those facts 
were vigorously disputed. These matters can 
only be resolved by a trial. p. 1291 
There are basic unresolved issues which 
prevent a summary judgment. 
In the case of Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, (Utah, 
1975), this court held: 
It only takes one sworn statement under 
oath to dispute the averments on the other 
side of the controversy and create an issue 
of fact. . . if there is any dispute as 
to any issue, material to the settlement of 
the controversy, the summary judgment should 
not be granted. p. 193 
This is the case in the instant matter. The lower court 
improperly granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff submits that the court holding in Western Pacific 
Transport Co. v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-op, No. 16056, 
(Utah, filed June 26, 1979) is also applicable to this case. 
We are entirely cognizant of the advantages 
of the summary judgment procedure in saving 
the time, effort and expense of a trial when 
it clearly appears that there areno disputed 
issues of material facts and the court can 
therefore rule for the moving party as a matter 
of law. However, the granting of such a motion 
fails of that objective, and the hoped for advan-
tages are not only lost, but there actually re-
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sults a greater expenditure of time and effort 
if there are such disputed issues to be resolved 
and the granting of such a motion is not justi-
fied. From what has been set forth above, it 
should be plain that in this case there are such 
disputed issues which ought to be tried. The 
motion was improperly granted and it is necessary 
that the case be remanded for trial. Costs to 
appellant (defendant). 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT 
AND NOT TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The lower court awarded attorney fees to Defendants pur-
suant to paragraph 21 of the contract. Said paragraph states: 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that 
should they default in any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, that the default-
ing party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which 
may arise or accrue from enforcing this agree-
ment, or in obtaining possession of the premises 
covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy pro-
vided hereunder or by the statutes of the State 
of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing 
a suit or otherwise. 
Said clause provides for payment of attorney fees arising 
from default in the terms or covenants of the contract. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff is not now and has never 
been in default under the terms of the agreement. Defendanto 
have had no need to enforce the agreement and it does not 
follow that Defendants be awarded attorney fees. 
No finding was made by the court that Plaintiff was in 
default on the contract or that Defendants had any need to 
enforce the agreement, indeed no averments were made or 
affidavits submitted in support of any such allegation. 
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Defendants are in default under the terms of paragraph 
8 of the contract for having refused to convey title and 
Plaintiff should be awarded an attorney fee for bringing 
this action. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the terms of the contract, the parties 
actions and the applicable law that the lower court's entry 
of summary judgment should be reversed as well as the lower 
court's award of attorney fees, Plaintiff has a right to con-
veyance of title under the contract and this matter should be 
remanded for trial on the issues of condition precedent to 
conveyance and damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this zs-- day of September, 1979. 
L. Henriod 
Steph n L. Henriod 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant to Mr. Dean L. Gray, Attorney for Defendants, 
1000 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage pre-
paid this~~ day of September, 1979. 
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